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Abstract
This is a study of a community-based fishery on the Rovuma River that forms the border between Mozambique and Tanza-
nia. We postulate a relationship between social capital and community-based governance over access to and the use of the 
fish resource. In historical times social capital was high and community-based governance regulated access to and use of 
the fishery as a common property resource. Transforming forces particularly colonial administration, advocating Christian-
ity, war and an emerging market economy undermined social capital, which in turn affected community-based governance. 
The deconstruction of social capital has resulted in attitudes and behaviours that challenge governance processes with dire 
consequences for sustainable resource utilisation. Harvesting of fish stocks occurs at levels that are no longer sustainable and 
inappropriate practices are being adopted. While the Mozambique government policy promotes community-based fisheries 
management in artisanal fisheries, we argue that under current conditions of ineffective community-based governance, a 
strong focus on reconstruction of social capital will be required before a community-based resource management process can 
be effectively implemented. The findings are discussed in the context of resilience in social ecological systems. We suggest 
that given the historical context in which community-based natural resource management is promoted within southern Africa 
such a focus may have wide relevance.
Keywords: social capital, governance, property rights, CBNRM, resilience, river fishery
Introduction
Attempts to introduce and sustain community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) have met with mixed success. 
While some authors have claimed high incidences of failure 
(Campbell et al., 2001; Dzingirai and Breen, 2005; Fabricius, 
2004), others have suggested that because CBNRM has the 
attributes of a complex system, emergent forces continually 
challenge stability such that phases of success, collapse and 
reconstruction should be anticipated (Anstey, 2005; Jones, 2005; 
Gunderson and Holling, 2002). It has been argued that instability 
arising from complex emergent forces usually leads to height-
ened uncertainty. Building on this understanding, it has been 
suggested that coping with uncertainty requires learning and 
adaptation of governance practices such that CBNRM is viewed 
as being complex and involving continuous problem-solving 
processes, rather than fixed state solutions (Carlsson and Berkes, 
2005; Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Berkes et al., 2003).
 Phases of change are inherently common in complex human 
processes such as CBNRM. Fabricius and Collins (2005) draw 
attention to a number of ‘classic surprises’ that are associated 
with phases of discontinuous change in CBNRM. Among these 
are conflict (Koch, 2004), financial mismanagement (Robbins, 
2000), and mismanagement of natural resources (Okello and 
Kiringi, 2004). Elsewhere, Anderies et al. (2004) have drawn 
attention to why simple social-ecological systems (SESs) can 
be robust over very long periods of time and how they can col-
lapse rather rapidly in response to disturbances. The evidence 
presented by these and other authors generally points to the 
understanding that change is an inherently pervasive variable 
in CBNRM processes. However, most approaches to interpret-
ing such change have been inadequate partly because they 
typically describe the development of CBNRM from initiation 
to stability.
 In this paper, we consider social capital as a major regu-
lator of discontinuous change in the governance processes 
of CBNRM. Given the support that social capital lends to the 
attributes of governance in the use and management of common 
property resources, we argue that social capital directly affects 
relationships among interest groups in a governance system and 
hence serves to buffer against destructive change in property 
rights regimes that would threaten sustainability. Volatility in 
social capital is reflected in the transformation of property rights 
regimes and tests the resilience of governance to respond to sys-
temic forces. We draw on a study of the Rovuma River fish-
ery postulating that the fishery was originally conducted in the 
context of common property (use of a resource with controls) 
that persisted for a long time. This property rights regime has 
over time changed to open access (use of a resource without or 
with ineffective controls) (Abacar, 2000). Drawing on resilience 
theory, we develop postulations that can be used to examine the 
forces that have directed this change. Our postulations, however, 
should be construed as a related set of explicit assumptions that 
can be used to better understand and improve CBNRM. We, 
of course, acknowledge that our assumptions are inherently 
incomplete and will evolve as new understandings of CBNRM 
processes emerge. Issues that are strongly related to resilience 
in common property resources form the basis of our assump-
tions. Accordingly, we believe that effective CBNRM should be 
founded on well-developed social capital that lends support to 
resilient and socially acceptable governance processes.
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Property rights and governance
Arguably, the nature and substance of governance systems 
affect the sustainability of common property resources. Ostrom 
(1990) and later Anderies et al. (2004) have proposed governance 
design principles (including rules, rule making and enforcement) 
that could be attributed to enduring common property resource 
management institutions.  Enduring in this context does not sim-
ply imply that there is some idealised or steady system state but 
rather that the institutions are resilient (Walker, 1989) or robust 
(Anderies et al., 2004). Resilient institutions are able to adapt 
to continually changing circumstances, thereby sustaining the 
structure and function of SESs. Important for this study, resil-
ience confers an ability to maintain desirable governance system 
properties despite fluctuations in structure and function.
 Rhodes (1996) has suggested that one definition of govern-
ance might be ‘self-organising networks’. Such networks are 
known to have the propensity to move through adaptive cycles 
involving four key phases: monopoly and conservation of struc-
ture; release and collapse; reorganisation and renewal; and 
growth to a potentially new monopolistic phase (Holling, 1973, 
1995; Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Ostrom and Janssen, 2002). 
Anstey (2005:144), considering the potential phases of CBNRM, 
has observed that ‘conservative phases may remain over long 
periods, injustice or inequality in key systems may become 
more resilient and undesirable configurations can persist.’ In this 
way, we can envisage that the reorganisation and growth phases 
involve a renewal of governance. We suggest that to determine 
whether there is reorganisation and/or growth, we would have to 
consider the transformation of property rights regimes.
 Property rights regimes are complex institutional structures 
and rules (formal and informal) that include both rights to access 
as well as rights to exclude from access (Schlager and Ostrom, 
1992). Property to which a community of people may rightfully 
claim access and use constitutes a common property. Because 
there are usually rules governing how members of the commu-
nity access and use the common property or resource (examples 
in Berkes et al., 2003), property rights ‘encompass a diverse set of 
tenure rules and other aspects of access to and use of resources’ 
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997:1303). Security of tenure is central 
to the notion of property rights (Gibbs and Bromley, 1989) and 
thus if we understand property rights to refer to an individual’s 
capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind his or her 
claim to a benefit stream (Bromley, 1991), then property rights 
essentially describe relationships between people.
 Conceptualising property rights from the perspective of rela-
tionships supports the contention of Ostrom (1990) that social 
homogeneity is important in management of use and access to 
common property. Not surprisingly, Singleton and Taylor (1992) 
consider that the term ‘community’ has been central to the evo-
lution of viable commons institutions. Thus, in seeking to estab-
lish whether the Rovuma fishery may have transformed from 
a common property to an open access regime, we argue that it 
would be necessary to establish that there existed dynamic rela-
tionships among those claiming rights of access to and use of the 
resource and with those that supported the allocation of rights of 
access and use of the resource. We contend that we cannot fully 
understand the effects of governance on resource sustainability 
without an understanding of how the underlying relationships 
help to shape property rights regime.
Social capital as an expression of relationships
Different authors use different ways to define and character-
ise social capital. Some approach the concept with terms such 
as norms and networks (see Coleman, 1990). Such terms refer 
to structures that emerge and constrain social interactions 
(Granovetter, 1985; Knoke, 1990). These structures are typically 
represented as socio-grams that illustrate the links among com-
munity members (Newman and Dale, 2005). For others, social 
capital refers to the stock of socio-psychological attributes of 
relationships including trust and commitment. Whilst the two 
attributes are not necessarily the only forms of social capital, 
most theorists view them as particularly important determinants 
of the nature of relationships. Trust, for example, is viewed as 
a socio-psychological state in which a party to a relationship 
adopts a belief that the other party will not act against its inter-
ests (Luo, 2002). As a socio-psychological state, trust evolves 
from an actor’s past experience, current interactions, and expec-
tations. Commitment, on the other hand, refers to the energies 
and resources invested by a party in building long-term rela-
tionships. It denotes the extent to which the party believes that 
a relationship is worth expending energies on.  Importantly, it 
evinces the readiness of the party to do more than is formally 
expected (Luo, 2002).
 For the purposes of this paper, we adopt a more holistic and 
pragmatic approach to defining social capital. We proceed by 
searching for a unifying framework in which we incorporate 
the most important insights of different perspectives. Accord-
ingly, we conceive social capital as comprising behavioural 
attributes that include trust, commitment, respect, networks and 
norms. Our interest is the behaviour of actors over time (Pet-
tigrew, 1973; 1990). From this perspective, the social capital that 
embodies relationships in the management of common prop-
erty is construed not as entities, but rather as a consequence of 
dynamic behavioural processes. As with all behavioural proc-
esses, social capital should be viewed as having outcomes, no 
matter how definable or indefinable those outcomes may be (see 
Cousins, 2002; Kinnaman and Bleich, 2004). Such a perspective 
denotes how adaptations in behavioural interactions take place 
between actors. Accordingly, in seeking to determine what role 
social capital may have played in the Rovuma fishery, we have 
to consider evidence for how adaptations provided premises on 
which actors rationalised their behavioural styles and how the 
actors responded to potentially disruptive forces. To determine 
whether there was collapse and reorganisation in the property 
regime, we have to consider the possible pathways for the devel-
opment of social capital.
 Putnam (1993) argues that social capital can make an impor-
tant contribution to improving society’s capacity to overcome 
social dilemmas, such as those that might arise in the use and 
management of a common property regime. It is this capacity 
that may foster resilience in governance over the allocation and 
use of the common property. Dekker and Uslaner (2001) suggest 
that social capital contributes to enforcing norms, supporting the 
view of Metcalfe (1994) who observed that communal resource 
management is enhanced if it is small enough for all members 
to meet face to face, to enforce conformity with rules through 
peer pressure, and to create long-standing identity. Anderies et 
al. (2004) extend these concepts into governance design princi-
ples for robust SESs stressing the importance of ‘clearly defined 
boundaries’, ‘proportionality of benefits’ and of ‘local users 
establishing harvesting and protection rules’ for resource use. 
Not surprisingly, Plummer and FitzGibbon (2006) conclude that 
social capital has a fundamental role in developing co-manage-
ment systems of river corridors.
 Inherent in the foregoing interpretations is that social capi-
tal would help to counter forces tending to disrupt a common 
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property regime. Bridger and Luloff (in Stokowski, 2003) sug-
gest that successful cooperation for long term mutual benefit in 
the management of common property depends on cultivation of 
social capital. It follows that in circumstances where a legitimate 
common property regime has ‘collapsed’ and been replaced by 
an illegitimate open access regime that is perceived to be unde-
sirable, the community would need to reconstruct social capital 
during reorganisation and growth before a new state can emerge. 
The successful operation of a community-based fishery govern-
ance system clearly depends on the relationships among those 
who fish and the greater community through whom the rights to 
fish are negotiated and allocated. Such a network of relationships 
(founded on norms, trust, commitment and respect for neigh-
bours and leaders) is what we refer to as social capital.
The study area and methods
Study area
This study focused on the fishery that operates on the Rovuma 
River as well as the floodplain between the Lucheringo and 
Messinge tributaries (Fig. 1). The Rovuma River captures the 
Lucheringo and Messinge tributaries draining northwards and 
defines the boundary between Mozambique and Tanzania. The 
fishery exploits the rivers and lakes that form along the flood-
plains. This area forms the northern part of a CBNRM initia-
tive, the Chipanje Chetu Project, which has been supported by 
the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and Mozambique Gov-
ernment Department of Wildlife and Forestry (IUCN, 1998). It 
should be noted that the case study presented herein is neither 
meant to be comprehensive nor exhaustive; rather it is only 
designed to be exploratory and illustrative. While the inclusion 
of areas on the Tanzanian side could perhaps have provided val-
uable insights, time and logistical constraints limited the study 
to just the Mozambican side. Nevertheless, the case study is still 
instructive particularly in illustrating why and how discontinu-
ous change occurs in CBNRM processes.
 The Yao or Ajauas are reputed to be the indigenous inhabit-
ants of this area which is presided over by a traditional chief 
locally known in Yao language as ‘Mwenye’ and his N’dunas or 
headmen (Amaral, 1990). Bunn and Auslander (1998) consider 
it likely that in the pre-colonial era, before present-day politi-
cal boundaries were defined, those who used resources of the 
river and its floodplains were drawn from north and south, and 
were ‘one’ despite the inexactness of border identities. The Yao 
have come under the religious influences of Islam and, since the 
arrival of the Portuguese possibly in the 15th century but more 
significantly since the 18th century (Anstey, 2005), of Catholi-
cism. However, most people in the study area (90%) follow 
Islam. During the war of liberation and the subsequent civil war 
many people fled to Tanzania. Nowadays, Kiswahili is the domi-
nant language among young people of the area (Abacar, 2000; 
Anstey, 2005).
 Agriculture is the predominant subsistence activity but 
production levels do not constantly meet household nutritional 
needs (Rachide, 1999 in Abacar, 2000). Fish is the most impor-
tant traded resource and harvesting is considered to be at levels 
that cannot be sustained (Anstey, 2005; Abacar, 2000).
Methods
The study employed the approach of qualitative field research as 
its core scientific methodology. This was premised on the under-
standing that the neglect of the analysis of behavioural proc-
esses in collaborative natural resources management (Nkhata 
et al., 2008) necessitates a qualitative field research methodol-
ogy to facilitate a processual framing of field situations. This 
methodology is essentially concerned with non-numerical data, 
as opposed to numerical data which are essentially a purview 
of quantitative research (Babbie, 1995). According to Strauss 
and Corbin (1998), qualitative field research is largely a non-
mathematical process of interpreting data through discovering 
linkages between concepts and themes. It is mostly concerned 
with theory generated from the study of small scale populations. 
Qualitative field research does not only provide a means for 
gathering data, but also a way for building knowledge about the 
social world. Although this methodology is primarily concerned 
with field settings, there are many different methods that one 
can use to gather qualitative field data. To mitigate the inherent 
threats to validity posed by the many different qualitative data 
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 To assess the evolution of community-based governance, 
data was gathered using a combination of extensive documentary 
analysis, focus group interviews and structured and unstruc-
tured interviews with individuals (Saunders et al., 1997). The 
interest was in detecting change in time rather than gathering 
detailed factual information on community-based governance. 
The same set of questions was put to each respondent who had 
lifetime experiences of the area and issues at hand. Respond-
ents, however, were also given opportunity to elaborate and the 
researcher was able to probe and seek clarity of the meaning of 
responses. Upon arrival at a village the researcher introduced 
himself to the headman (N’duna) and sought permission to con-
duct research. The N’duna then called together senior advisors 
numbering between 2 and 4. These constituted the ‘focus groups’ 
who responded to the questionnaire and with whom there was 
lively discussion. Through the focus groups the key informants 
(Kumar, 1989) were identified and subsequent respondents were 
identified using the chain referral sampling method (Babbie, 
1995). It was not possible to interview all those who were rec-
ommended as some were not available during the field work. Ten 
elders and 46 fishermen and 4 fish processors were interviewed 
(Table 1). Six people identified by the focus groups and drawn 
from 2 villages (Madiera and Machedje) volunteered as guides 
and introduced the researcher to respondents.
The changing context of governance
In this section we offer a perspective of the changing context of 
governance in the Rovuma fishery. We argue that a resilience 
approach offers useful perspective for the study of change in 
community-based governance, especially as it relates to common 
property regimes. We suggest that the property rights regime of 
the Rovuma community-based governance system has over time 
transformed from a common property to an open access regime. 
We propose a framework that represents the phases of an adap-
tive cycle of the Rovuma community-based governance system 
to interpret the nature and substance of this transformation. 
The framework is used to determine the potential for change 
based on the amount of social capital. The elements of social 
capital are proposed as a foundation for resilience in commu-
nity-based governance. It is from the perspective of social capi-
tal that behavioural processes are vital in interpreting change 
in the property rights regimes that underlie community-based 
governance. In this context, change is defined by the degree of 
stability and instability of social capital. Social capital provides 
the basis of change to the extent that it enables a property rights 
regime to develop, mature, collapse, and reorganise based on 
adaptations. As shown in Fig. 2, the property rights regime of 
the Rovuma community-based governance system has over time 
gone through phases of an adaptive cycle from a conservation 
phase through release into a reorganisation phase.
Conservation phase
From a resilience perspective, a conservation phase is one in 
which social capital is well consolidated (Nkhata et al., 2008). 
It is essentially an emergent phase whereby slow accumulation 
of social capital results in complex structures of interactions 
among resource users. The property rights in this phase have the 
advantage of functioning through cooperative rather than mar-
ket or bureaucratic instruments (Huxham, 1996). Thus, it is pos-
TABLE 1
List of key informants interviewed during the study 
Category of respondents Number
Elders
Village representatives
    Madiera village secretary 1
Traditional chiefs
    Mwenye/Sultan




    Madiera local council/committee
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Low social capital 
Weak community-based governance 
Open access 
High potential for change in 
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The resilience model is 
presented to illustrate 
the adaptations that 
have occurred in the 
Rovuma community-
based governance 
system and those 
necessary to reinstate 
a common property 
resource system are 
postulated (adapted 
from Holling, 1995).
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sible in the conservation phase to find parties who offer benefits 
to others even when they get nothing tangible in return. Even 
if such behaviours may encourage mutual cooperation, they 
are not necessarily altruistic in nature. Although it is impos-
sible to predict the timescale on which a particular property 
rights regime would reach a conservation phase, it is important 
to note that cooperative behaviours in this phase are the emer-
gent result of continuing interactions between parties (Axelrod, 
1984). Such interactions are based on exchanges that may not 
necessarily involve material artefacts, but also other intrinsic 
behavioural variables such as bribes, promises, gifts, rewards, 
and even sanctions.
 It is within this understanding that we suggest that, during 
the pre-colonial period but before the Mozambican civil war, the 
Rovuma community-based governance system was in a conser-
vation phase (Fig. 2). The study revealed that during this period 
there were strong internal links within the community reflecting 
highly developed social capital. Under these conditions, rights of 
access and fishing practices were regulated and the fishery oper-
ated as a common property resource. The interviews conducted 
for this study showed that in those times the Chief determined 
who could fish and that groups of fishermen would have ‘exclu-
sive rights’ to fish a particular area. Respondents elaborated that 
people from outside the community had to approach the Chief for 
permission to fish and that if this was granted they would make a 
gift of fish to the Chief, particularly when leaving the area. Fail-
ure to comply could bring bad luck in fishing and perhaps even 
more serious misfortune (Abacar, 2000). The responses of the 
elders further revealed that the traditional fishery was character-
ised by clear distinction of a ‘group of users’ to whom property 
was common. This property rights regime allowed for the estab-
lishment of rules that governed access to and use of the prop-
erty. Thus, it is suggestive that the Rovuma community-based 
governance system during this phase operated under a property 
rights regime that provided for the management of relationships 
between people. Hence, the assumption that social capital was 
relatively high during this phase.
Release phase
As the community-based governance system progressively 
became more conservative, and thus more vulnerable to change, 
the conservation phase gave way to release. Resilience theorists 
refer to this new emergent phase as adversarial (Nkhata et al., 
2008) when the capacity for change is low as the social capi-
tal begins to degenerate due to growth in adversarial behaviour. 
While the property rights under this phase may still be founded 
on relatively high levels of social capital, the potential is high 
for the regime to generate conflict, which is associated with sig-
nificant administrative and coordination costs (Lubell, 2004). 
Although the sources of conflict may be beyond the control of 
members of the community, the progressive degeneration of 
social capital may lead to the deinstitutionalisation of property 
rights. It is for this reason that we postulate that the nature of the 
property rights under a release phase is important in elucidating 
the governance of common property.
 We characterise the period during the colonial administra-
tion but after the Mozambican civil war as a release phase (Fig. 
2). During this period, the Rovuma community-based govern-
ance system started to exhibit signs of ineffective or absence of 
regulations. The elders interviewed indicated that the commu-
nity-based governance system during this period was no longer 
effective. They noted that the attitudes and behaviours of the 
community members had changed from ones that viewed the 
fishery as a supplier of food to one that saw it as a commercial 
entity. The elders elaborated that self-interest had led to an ero-
sion of cultural identity of community and group ownership over 
the resource. The Mozambican civil war in the post-colonial era 
drove many people into exile in Tanzania leading to local link-
ages being weakened. While the arrival of the Catholic Church 
might have led to new external linkages, the Church had little 
effect on social capital because its belief system was strongly 
resisted. By contrast, the introduction of a market economy by 
the colonial administrators as well as the return of the refugees 
from camps in Tanzania after the end of the civil war had affected 
the property rights regime. The N’dunas, who previously were 
mere headmen, started to behave like Mwenyes (Chiefs) and 
instead of going back to their original locations chose to settle 
elsewhere so they could gain more power and influence. It was 
claimed that the collapse of power relations fractured the com-
munity by weakening traditional norms and values as well as 
trust and commitment among community members, which in 
turn affected the property rights regime.
 This situation led to the degradation of the fishery. The 
respondents revealed that fish catches during this period had 
declined. They indicated that most of the fishermen were seen 
to change fishing sites to follow availability of stocks. It was 
observed that there was total disregard of the significance of 
spawning sites which were previously designated as no fishing 
areas. Declining catches against an ever-growing demand for fish 
as a source of protein for the locals and the commercial market 
created unprecedented competition over limited fish resources. 
The respondents claimed that competition among fishermen was 
a major problem. The desire to out-compete other fishermen had 
encouraged the use of practices previously considered inappro-
priate. Small meshed gill nets, hooks, poison plants and traps 
were used to capture fish.
 It could be argued that the increase in societal heterogeneity 
was perhaps the main driver for the release. It changed internal 
relationships and weakened further the social capital thereby 
deinstitutionalising the common property rights that had been 
undermined during the colonial period. When respondents 
were asked to indicate the implications of the introduction of 
external social forces, the elders observed that this influenced 
the relationships among people. They elaborated that as most 
people could not read or write Portuguese at the time they were 
afraid and could not express opinions. They further claimed that 
illiteracy was a mechanism they used to resist change to Chris-
tianity to the extent that they would also not attend school. It 
also helped them to avoid eating pork as was forbidden by their 
Muslim faith. The findings suggest that at one time there were 
strongly developed norms, relationships, trust and respect. How-
ever, even in these early times the new social forces challenged 
the property rights regime.
Reorganisation phase 
Reorganisation, in the context of resilience theory, is a phase 
when a community-based governance system is reorganised 
through the emergence of new tactics and opportunities. Dur-
ing this phase, whereas the capacity for change is high due to 
the re-strengthening of social capital, the property rights regime 
would still be regaining focus. Depending on particular condi-
tions, reorganisation may lead to a shift into a new configuration 
of less or more cooperative behaviours.
 Reorganisation in the Rovuma community-based govern-
ance system is evidenced in the present state of the post-colonial 
era (Fig. 2). In the present state, the social capital is relatively 
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low and the property rights regime is generally operating as 
open access.  The elders interviewed during this study claimed 
that this situation has emerged due to the fact that traditional 
institutions were undermined during the colonial period. They 
claimed that at the time of the interviews there were no controls 
regulating access and use. They elaborated that people no longer 
seek permission from the Chief and that non-traditional meth-
ods such as the use of poisons, have continued to be introduced 
to maximise catch. One of the elders commented that control 
over use is now the responsibility of government and that the 
power of Chiefs is limited to mediation. When fishermen were 
asked whether there were ways in which the situation could be 
improved, they suggested that going back to the older property 
regime through support of traditional controls could help. They 
suggested that the creation of local committees and co-manage-
ment could provide a solution, in a way indicative of the influ-
ence of the Chipanje Chetu CBNRM initiative, which is cur-
rently being implemented in the area.
 The aim of the Chipanje Chetu CBNRM initiative has been 
‘the transfer of rights and responsibilities for land and resource 
management to local level user groups (a village community 
or group from within a village)’ (Anstey, 2005:183). Although 
not explicitly stated, this may also have the intention of rebuild-
ing social capital. The fishery now has elements necessary for 
the development of a complex common property rights system 
in which some claim traditional rights and others claim rights 
through use. In such a contested situation, it is hard to envis-
age establishing an effective management process until there 
is agreement on rights and governance. But this also requires 
that trust, respect, norms and authority that are supportive of 
community-based governance are established.
 The fisheries policy of the Mozambiqican Government 
declares the intention to promote the formation of artisanal co-
management committees in areas exhibiting over-fishing (Insti-
tute for Development of Fisheries of Small Scale, IDDPE, 1999a 
and b). The Rovuma River fishery is artisanal and qualifies for 
co-management. In this way, distinction can be drawn between 
the process of co-managing and the manner of governing the 
process (Imperial, 2005). Co-management seeks to establish a 
process of management in which the manner of governing is 
characterised by devolution of authority, roles and responsibili-
ties to those who can rightfully claim ownership (not necessarily 
use) of the resource. The manner of governing the process (gov-
ernance) has particular significance in the process of managing 
the use of common property. This is because of the importance 
of networking among stakeholders to build and sustain trust, 
commitment, respect, leadership and shared norms that provide 
a foundation for governance. In other words, governance and 
social capital are strongly interdependent and both need to be 
nurtured by stakeholders (Imperial and Kauneckis 2003).
Forces directing change
In postulating a change from common property to an open access 
regime it was necessary to postulate the probable forces that 
directed change. These are illustrated in Fig. 3. From the per-
spective of this study, the earliest force is considered to be colo-
nisation by the Portuguese in the late 1800s. This would under-
mine the governance system (Harrison, 2002; Anstey, 2005) 
and the social capital that sustained it by weakening traditional 
authority and concomitant breakdown of trust, commitment 
and norms among community members. By contrast, the Mus-
lim faith and its associated values and norms  reinforced social 
capital especially as the pressure for conversion by the Catholic 
Church to Christianity and to speak Portuguese (Anstey, 2005) 
fostered resistance (Abacar, 2000), thereby engendering cohe-
sion within society. We postulate, however, that the overriding 
consequence was a weakening of governance reflected in con-
trols over the fishery, as has happened in other similar situations 
(see Hara, 2005).
 Our premise is that the fishery increasingly came under 
the influence of a market economy driven largely by increas-
ing demand and reinforced by associations of returning refugees 
(Abacar, 2000; Anstey, 2005). Integration of subsistence fish-
eries into market economies, where profit motivates exploita-
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Nielsen, 2003). Hara (2005:49), considering two fisher commu-
nities in Malawi (also Yao and mostly Muslim), observed that 
under the influence of a market economy we should not unques-
tioningly assume continued existence of a ‘rural community’ 
character and traits such as unity, homogeneity, coherence and 
stability, much less the capacity to engage in and carry out col-
lective action. Thus, one would argue that the influx of ‘foreign’ 
people into the Rovuma area and transformation of the artisanal 
fishery by new market forces would together have exerted pro-
found negative effects on social capital and subsequently com-
munity-based governance. Weakening control facilitated transi-
tion from common property to open access. This resulted in the 
breakdown of the processes of allocating rights and regulating 
use so that anyone could access the resource, with each individ-
ual deciding independently as this allowed the property rights 
regime to operate with low transactional costs.
 In sum, the foregoing is indicative of a deconstruction of 
social capital and a breakdown of legitimacy leading to open 
access. This is as a result of a number of interlinked factors; 
traditions and authority have been weakened; the definition and 
cohesion of the group of fishermen have been disrupted; tenure 
over the resource is no longer defined either in location or in per-
son; and there is no legitimate control over who harvests where, 
when, how and how much. It is even not possible to sanction 
those that are clearly breaching the norms and traditional regula-
tions for fishing. Consequently, there is a self-reinforcing cycle 
resulting from a lack of sanctioning with more and more people 
engaging in inappropriate fishing practices.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the effects of social capital on the 
governance processes of CBNRM. We have attempted to illus-
trate how social capital lends support to the attributes of govern-
ance in the use and management of common property resources. 
In so doing, we have shown that social capital directly affects 
relationships within a governance system. This is particularly 
important as it suggests that social capital serves to buffer against 
destructive change in property rights regimes that would threaten 
sustainability. As demonstrated in the Rovuma case, decreased 
social capital lowered the effectiveness of property rights and 
allowed ‘individualistic’ behaviours, shifting the system into an 
open-access regime. The governance system, characterised by 
low social capital, weak community-based governance and an 
open access fishery, was not able to maintain those properties that 
would confer resilience. Whilst there is high potential for change 
from this phase (Nkhata et al., 2008), and indeed the Chipanje 
Chetu CBNRM initiative seeks to bring about such change, we 
suggest that this will be achieved only when social capital and 
community-based governance have been strengthened.
 This study illustrates the value of social capital in manag-
ing the use of the resource prior to colonisation. It also shows 
that social capital was the foundation for resilience enabling 
the people to resist efforts to introduce Christianity so that they 
retained their Muslim faith. Whilst in the past there may have 
existed a strong sense of ‘community’ sustained by social capital 
that enabled it to deal with differences and conflicts (the clas-
sic surprises of Fabricius and Collins, 2005) the evidence sug-
gests that this is no longer the case. In the area of north Sanga, 
Anstey (2005:182) observes that governance has ‘limited and 
varied local influence on either customary or state administra-
tion’ and there is a ‘chasm between formal and informal systems 
and general vacuum and suspicion of authority’. While Fabri-
cius and Collins (2005) have suggested that natural and social 
capital are commonly well represented in CBNRM initiatives, it 
may be justified to claim that in many instances such initiatives 
do not automatically enhance natural and social capital. On the 
other, it may be reasonable to contend that it is practically pos-
sible to re-establish natural and social capital in situations where 
they have both been depleted. In such situations, we postulate 
that progress may be significantly enhanced if reconstruction of 
social capital was addressed explicitly and specifically. 
 This study is particularly instructive in that it demonstrates 
that it is in the nature of complex systems that they will exhibit 
non-linear behaviour (Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Ostrom 
and Janssen, 2002; Walker, 1989). The Rovuma fishery illus-
trates a period of monopoly followed by collapse under the influ-
ence of intersecting forces (see also Abel, et al., 2006; Nkhata, 
et al., 2008). The Chipanje Chetu CBNRM initiative suggests 
reorganisation. However, insofar as the fishery is concerned, it 
is too early to perceive growth toward a new state. What seems 
inevitable is that the new state will differ very significantly from 
the former state even if it is returned to a common property sys-
tem. Such transformations have been recorded elsewhere such 
as in watershed governance in the Lake Thaoe Basin (Imperial 
and Kauneckis, 2003), in transnational rivers management in 
the Zambezi River basin (Turton et al., 2005) and collaborative 
wildlife management in Namibia (Jones, 2005). 
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